CVE-2024-5217 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Details

CVE-2024-5217
Vulnerability Scoring

9.8
/10
Critical Risk

As a catastrophic security flaw, CVE-2024-5217 has severe implications, demanding immediate intervention.

Attack Complexity Details

  • Attack Complexity: Low
    Exploits can be performed without significant complexity or special conditions.
  • Attack Vector: Network
    Vulnerability is exploitable over a network without physical access.
  • Privileges Required: None
    No privileges are required for exploitation.
  • Scope: Unchanged
    Exploit remains within the originally vulnerable component.
  • User Interaction: None
    No user interaction is necessary for exploitation.

CVE-2024-5217 Details

Status: Analyzed

Last updated: 🕡 27 Nov 2024, 18:56 UTC
Originally published on: 🕔 10 Jul 2024, 17:15 UTC

Time between publication and last update: 140 days

CVSS Release: version 3

CVSS3 Source

psirt@servicenow.com

CVSS3 Type

Secondary

CVSS3 Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVE-2024-5217 Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2024-5217: ServiceNow has addressed an input validation vulnerability that was identified in the Washington DC, Vancouver, and earlier Now Platform releases. This vulnerability could enable an unauthenticated user to remotely execute code within the context of the Now Platform. The vulnerability is addressed in the listed patches and hot fixes below, which were released during the June 2024 patching cycle. If you have not done so already, we recommend applying security patches relevant to your instance as soon as possible.

Assessing the Risk of CVE-2024-5217

Access Complexity Graph

The exploitability of CVE-2024-5217 depends on two key factors: attack complexity (the level of effort required to execute an exploit) and privileges required (the access level an attacker needs).

Exploitability Analysis for CVE-2024-5217

With low attack complexity and no required privileges, CVE-2024-5217 is an easy target for cybercriminals. Organizations should prioritize immediate mitigation measures to prevent unauthorized access and data breaches.

Understanding AC and PR

A lower complexity and fewer privilege requirements make exploitation easier. Security teams should evaluate these aspects to determine the urgency of mitigation strategies, such as patch management and access control policies.

Attack Complexity (AC) measures the difficulty in executing an exploit. A high AC means that specific conditions must be met, making an attack more challenging, while a low AC means the vulnerability can be exploited with minimal effort.

Privileges Required (PR) determine the level of system access necessary for an attack. Vulnerabilities requiring no privileges are more accessible to attackers, whereas high privilege requirements limit exploitation to authorized users with elevated access.

CVSS Score Breakdown Chart

Above is the CVSS Sub-score Breakdown for CVE-2024-5217, illustrating how Base, Impact, and Exploitability factors combine to form the overall severity rating. A higher sub-score typically indicates a more severe or easier-to-exploit vulnerability.

CIA Impact Analysis

Below is the Impact Analysis for CVE-2024-5217, showing how Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability might be affected if the vulnerability is exploited. Higher values usually signal greater potential damage.

  • Confidentiality: High
    Exploiting CVE-2024-5217 can result in unauthorized access to sensitive data, severely compromising data privacy.
  • Integrity: High
    CVE-2024-5217 could allow unauthorized modifications to data, potentially affecting system reliability and trust.
  • Availability: High
    CVE-2024-5217 can disrupt system operations, potentially causing complete denial of service (DoS).

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

The EPSS score estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the near future.

EPSS Score: 94.585% (probability of exploit)

EPSS Percentile: 99.45% (lower percentile = lower relative risk)
This vulnerability is less risky than approximately 0.5499999999999972% of others.

CVE-2024-5217 References

External References

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-697

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

  • Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables CAPEC-10 This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the adversary finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
  • Double Encoding CAPEC-120 The adversary utilizes a repeating of the encoding process for a set of characters (that is, character encoding a character encoding of a character) to obfuscate the payload of a particular request. This may allow the adversary to bypass filters that attempt to detect illegal characters or strings, such as those that might be used in traversal or injection attacks. Filters may be able to catch illegal encoded strings, but may not catch doubly encoded strings. For example, a dot (.), often used in path traversal attacks and therefore often blocked by filters, could be URL encoded as %2E. However, many filters recognize this encoding and would still block the request. In a double encoding, the % in the above URL encoding would be encoded again as %25, resulting in %252E which some filters might not catch, but which could still be interpreted as a dot (.) by interpreters on the target.
  • Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow CAPEC-14 This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile service. This hostile service is created to deliver the correct content to the client software. For example, if the client-side application is a browser, the service will host a webpage that the browser loads.
  • Command Delimiters CAPEC-15 An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
  • Flash Injection CAPEC-182 An attacker tricks a victim to execute malicious flash content that executes commands or makes flash calls specified by the attacker. One example of this attack is cross-site flashing, an attacker controlled parameter to a reference call loads from content specified by the attacker.
  • Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow CAPEC-24 In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. the user input is let into the system unfiltered).
  • Leverage Alternate Encoding CAPEC-267 An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
  • Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters CAPEC-3 Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.
  • Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads CAPEC-41 This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.
  • Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers CAPEC-43 An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
  • Overflow Binary Resource File CAPEC-44 An attack of this type exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in the handling of binary resources. Binary resources may include music files like MP3, image files like JPEG files, and any other binary file. These attacks may pass unnoticed to the client machine through normal usage of files, such as a browser loading a seemingly innocent JPEG file. This can allow the adversary access to the execution stack and execute arbitrary code in the target process.
  • Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links CAPEC-45 This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
  • Overflow Variables and Tags CAPEC-46 This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a formatted configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The adversary crafts a malicious HTML page or configuration file that includes oversized strings, thus causing an overflow.
  • Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion CAPEC-47 In this attack, the target software is given input that the adversary knows will be modified and expanded in size during processing. This attack relies on the target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data may exceed some internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow.
  • Embedding NULL Bytes CAPEC-52 An adversary embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target software. This attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a string terminator in many environments. The goal is for certain components of the target software to stop processing the input when it encounters the null byte(s).
  • Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash CAPEC-53 If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal NULL may not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL allows an adversary to embed the NULL mid-string while postfixing the proper data so that the filter is avoided. One example is a filter that looks for a trailing slash character. If a string insertion is possible, but the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of NULL in mid-string may be used.
  • Argument Injection CAPEC-6 An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
  • Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-64 This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
  • String Format Overflow in syslog() CAPEC-67 This attack targets applications and software that uses the syslog() function insecurely. If an application does not explicitely use a format string parameter in a call to syslog(), user input can be placed in the format string parameter leading to a format string injection attack. Adversaries can then inject malicious format string commands into the function call leading to a buffer overflow. There are many reported software vulnerabilities with the root cause being a misuse of the syslog() function.
  • Blind SQL Injection CAPEC-7 Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.
  • Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-71 An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.
  • User-Controlled Filename CAPEC-73 An attack of this type involves an adversary inserting malicious characters (such as a XSS redirection) into a filename, directly or indirectly that is then used by the target software to generate HTML text or other potentially executable content. Many websites rely on user-generated content and dynamically build resources like files, filenames, and URL links directly from user supplied data. In this attack pattern, the attacker uploads code that can execute in the client browser and/or redirect the client browser to a site that the attacker owns. All XSS attack payload variants can be used to pass and exploit these vulnerabilities.
  • Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-78 This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
  • Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-79 This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
  • Buffer Overflow in an API Call CAPEC-8 This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. An adversary who has knowledge of known vulnerable libraries or shared code can easily target software that makes use of these libraries. All clients that make use of the code library thus become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad effect on security across a system, usually affecting more than one software process.
  • Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-80 This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.
  • OS Command Injection CAPEC-88 In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.
  • Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities CAPEC-9 This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of shells. An adversary can leverage a vulnerability found in a command-line utility to escalate privilege to root.
  • Forced Integer Overflow CAPEC-92 This attack forces an integer variable to go out of range. The integer variable is often used as an offset such as size of memory allocation or similarly. The attacker would typically control the value of such variable and try to get it out of range. For instance the integer in question is incremented past the maximum possible value, it may wrap to become a very small, or negative number, therefore providing a very incorrect value which can lead to unexpected behavior. At worst the attacker can execute arbitrary code.

Vulnerable Configurations

  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:early_availability:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:early_availability:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1_hotfix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1_hotfix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_1_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10a_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10a_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_10b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2_hotfix_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_2_hotfix_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_3_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_3_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_3_hotfix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_3_hotfix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_3b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_3b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_4b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_4b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_5:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_4_hotfix_5:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_5:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_5:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_5_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_5_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_6:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_6:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_6_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_6_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_6_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_6_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_7b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_8:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_8:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_8_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_8_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_9:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_9:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_9_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_9_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_9_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_9_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_9_hotfix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:utah:patch_9_hotfix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_1_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_1_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_2_hotfix1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3_hotfix_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_3_hotfix_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4_hotfix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4_hotfix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4_hotfix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_4_hotfix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_5:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_5:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_5_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_5_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_6:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_6:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_6_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_6_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_3a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_3a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotfix_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotifix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotifix_1a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotifix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotifix_1b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotifix_2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotifix_2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotifix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_7_hotifix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_8:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_8:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_8_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_8_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_8_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_8_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_8_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_8_hotfix_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_9:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:vancouver:patch_9:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1_hotfix_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1_hotfix_2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1_hotfix_2a:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1_hotfix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_1_hotfix_2b:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_2_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_2_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_3_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_3_hotfix_1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_5:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:servicenow:servicenow:washington_dc:patch_5:*:*:*:*:*:*

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