CVE-2022-4559 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Details

CVE-2022-4559
Vulnerability Scoring

3.5
/10
Moderate Risk

Exploiting CVE-2022-4559 requires specific conditions, leading to a moderate security impact.

Attack Complexity Details

  • Attack Complexity: Low
    Exploits can be performed without significant complexity or special conditions.
  • Attack Vector: Network
    Vulnerability is exploitable over a network without physical access.
  • Privileges Required: Low
    Some privileges are necessary to exploit the vulnerability.
  • Scope: Unchanged
    Exploit remains within the originally vulnerable component.
  • User Interaction: Required
    User interaction is necessary for successful exploitation.

CVE-2022-4559 Details

Status: Modified

Last updated: 🕢 21 Nov 2024, 07:35 UTC
Originally published on: 🕔 16 Dec 2022, 17:15 UTC

Time between publication and last update: 705 days

CVSS Release: version 3

CVSS3 Source

cna@vuldb.com

CVSS3 Type

Secondary

CVSS3 Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

CVE-2022-4559 Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2022-4559: A vulnerability was found in INEX IPX-Manager up to 6.2.0. It has been declared as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the file resources/views/customer/list.foil.php. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. The attack can be initiated remotely. Upgrading to version 6.3.0 is able to address this issue. The name of the patch is bc9b14c6f70cccdb89b559e8bc3a7318bfe9c243. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. VDB-215962 is the identifier assigned to this vulnerability.

Assessing the Risk of CVE-2022-4559

Access Complexity Graph

The exploitability of CVE-2022-4559 depends on two key factors: attack complexity (the level of effort required to execute an exploit) and privileges required (the access level an attacker needs).

Exploitability Analysis for CVE-2022-4559

CVE-2022-4559 presents an accessible attack vector with minimal effort required. Restricting access controls and implementing security updates are critical to reducing exploitation risks.

Understanding AC and PR

A lower complexity and fewer privilege requirements make exploitation easier. Security teams should evaluate these aspects to determine the urgency of mitigation strategies, such as patch management and access control policies.

Attack Complexity (AC) measures the difficulty in executing an exploit. A high AC means that specific conditions must be met, making an attack more challenging, while a low AC means the vulnerability can be exploited with minimal effort.

Privileges Required (PR) determine the level of system access necessary for an attack. Vulnerabilities requiring no privileges are more accessible to attackers, whereas high privilege requirements limit exploitation to authorized users with elevated access.

CVSS Score Breakdown Chart

Above is the CVSS Sub-score Breakdown for CVE-2022-4559, illustrating how Base, Impact, and Exploitability factors combine to form the overall severity rating. A higher sub-score typically indicates a more severe or easier-to-exploit vulnerability.

CIA Impact Analysis

Below is the Impact Analysis for CVE-2022-4559, showing how Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability might be affected if the vulnerability is exploited. Higher values usually signal greater potential damage.

  • Confidentiality: None
    CVE-2022-4559 has no significant impact on data confidentiality.
  • Integrity: Low
    Exploiting CVE-2022-4559 may cause minor changes to data without severely impacting its accuracy.
  • Availability: None
    CVE-2022-4559 does not impact system availability.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

The EPSS score estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the near future.

EPSS Score: 0.071% (probability of exploit)

EPSS Percentile: 33.97% (lower percentile = lower relative risk)
This vulnerability is less risky than approximately 66.03% of others.

CVE-2022-4559 References

External References

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-707

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

  • XML Injection CAPEC-250 An attacker utilizes crafted XML user-controllable input to probe, attack, and inject data into the XML database, using techniques similar to SQL injection. The user-controllable input can allow for unauthorized viewing of data, bypassing authentication or the front-end application for direct XML database access, and possibly altering database information.
  • Inter-component Protocol Manipulation CAPEC-276 Inter-component protocols are used to communicate between different software and hardware modules within a single computer. Common examples are: interrupt signals and data pipes. Subverting the protocol can allow an adversary to impersonate others, discover sensitive information, control the outcome of a session, or perform other attacks. This type of attack targets invalid assumptions that may be inherent in implementers of the protocol, incorrect implementations of the protocol, or vulnerabilities in the protocol itself.
  • Data Interchange Protocol Manipulation CAPEC-277 Data Interchange Protocols are used to transmit structured data between entities. These protocols are often specific to a particular domain (B2B: purchase orders, invoices, transport logistics and waybills, medical records). They are often, but not always, XML-based. Subverting the protocol can allow an adversary to impersonate others, discover sensitive information, control the outcome of a session, or perform other attacks. This type of attack targets invalid assumptions that may be inherent in implementers of the protocol, incorrect implementations of the protocol, or vulnerabilities in the protocol itself.
  • Web Services Protocol Manipulation CAPEC-278 An adversary manipulates a web service related protocol to cause a web application or service to react differently than intended. This can either be performed through the manipulation of call parameters to include unexpected values, or by changing the called function to one that should normally be restricted or limited. By leveraging this pattern of attack, the adversary is able to gain access to data or resources normally restricted, or to cause the application or service to crash.
  • SOAP Manipulation CAPEC-279 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is used as a communication protocol between a client and server to invoke web services on the server. It is an XML-based protocol, and therefore suffers from many of the same shortcomings as other XML-based protocols. Adversaries can make use of these shortcomings and manipulate the content of SOAP paramters, leading to undesirable behavior on the server and allowing the adversary to carry out a number of further attacks.
  • Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters CAPEC-3 Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.
  • Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers CAPEC-43 An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
  • Generic Cross-Browser Cross-Domain Theft CAPEC-468 An attacker makes use of Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) injection to steal data cross domain from the victim's browser. The attack works by abusing the standards relating to loading of CSS: 1. Send cookies on any load of CSS (including cross-domain) 2. When parsing returned CSS ignore all data that does not make sense before a valid CSS descriptor is found by the CSS parser.
  • Embedding NULL Bytes CAPEC-52 An adversary embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target software. This attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a string terminator in many environments. The goal is for certain components of the target software to stop processing the input when it encounters the null byte(s).
  • Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash CAPEC-53 If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal NULL may not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL allows an adversary to embed the NULL mid-string while postfixing the proper data so that the filter is avoided. One example is a filter that looks for a trailing slash character. If a string insertion is possible, but the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of NULL in mid-string may be used.
  • Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-64 This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
  • Blind SQL Injection CAPEC-7 Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.
  • Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-78 This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
  • Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-79 This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
  • XPath Injection CAPEC-83 An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of XPath expressions to inject the XML database and bypass authentication or glean information that they normally would not be able to. XPath Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the XML database, thus bypassing the application completely. XPath Injection results from the failure of an application to properly sanitize input used as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to query an XML database.
  • XQuery Injection CAPEC-84 This attack utilizes XQuery to probe and attack server systems; in a similar manner that SQL Injection allows an attacker to exploit SQL calls to RDBMS, XQuery Injection uses improperly validated data that is passed to XQuery commands to traverse and execute commands that the XQuery routines have access to. XQuery injection can be used to enumerate elements on the victim's environment, inject commands to the local host, or execute queries to remote files and data sources.

Vulnerable Configurations

  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.0.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.1.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.2.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.3.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.4.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.5.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.15:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.16:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.17:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.18:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.6.19:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:3.7.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.4.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.4.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.4.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.4.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.6.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.7.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.7.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.9.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.9.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.9.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.9.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.9.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.9.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:4.9.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.3.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.4.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.4.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.5.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.6.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.7.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:5.8.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:6.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:6.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:6.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:6.0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:6.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:6.1.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:6.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:inex:ixp_manager:6.2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Protect Your Infrastructure against CVE-2022-4559: Combat Critical CVE Threats

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