CVE-2019-9535 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Details

CVE-2019-9535 Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2019-9535: A vulnerability exists in the way that iTerm2 integrates with tmux's control mode, which may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands by providing malicious output to the terminal. This affects versions of iTerm2 up to and including 3.3.5. This vulnerability may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands on their victim's computer by providing malicious output to the terminal. It could be exploited using command-line utilities that print attacker-controlled content.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

The EPSS score estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the near future.

EPSS Score: 0.916% (probability of exploit)

EPSS Percentile: 83.04% (lower percentile = lower relative risk)
This vulnerability is less risky than approximately 16.959999999999994% of others.

CVE-2019-9535 References

External References

• https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2019/10/09/iterm2-critical-issue-moss-audit/
• https://groups.google.com/forum/#%21topic/iterm2-discuss/57k_AuLdQa4
• https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/763073/
• https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2019/10/09/iterm2-critical-issue-moss-audit/
• https://groups.google.com/forum/#%21topic/iterm2-discuss/57k_AuLdQa4
• https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/763073/

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

• Buffer Overflow via Environment Variables CAPEC-10 This attack pattern involves causing a buffer overflow through manipulation of environment variables. Once the adversary finds that they can modify an environment variable, they may try to overflow associated buffers. This attack leverages implicit trust often placed in environment variables.
• Server Side Include (SSI) Injection CAPEC-101 An attacker can use Server Side Include (SSI) Injection to send code to a web application that then gets executed by the web server. Doing so enables the attacker to achieve similar results to Cross Site Scripting, viz., arbitrary code execution and information disclosure, albeit on a more limited scale, since the SSI directives are nowhere near as powerful as a full-fledged scripting language. Nonetheless, the attacker can conveniently gain access to sensitive files, such as password files, and execute shell commands.
• HTTP Request Splitting CAPEC-105 An adversary abuses the flexibility and discrepancies in the parsing and interpretation of HTTP Request messages by different intermediary HTTP agents (e.g., load balancer, reverse proxy, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc.) to split a single HTTP request into multiple unauthorized and malicious HTTP requests to a back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server). See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.
• Command Line Execution through SQL Injection CAPEC-108 An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
• Double Encoding CAPEC-120 The adversary utilizes a repeating of the encoding process for a set of characters (that is, character encoding a character encoding of a character) to obfuscate the payload of a particular request. This may allow the adversary to bypass filters that attempt to detect illegal characters or strings, such as those that might be used in traversal or injection attacks. Filters may be able to catch illegal encoded strings, but may not catch doubly encoded strings. For example, a dot (.), often used in path traversal attacks and therefore often blocked by filters, could be URL encoded as %2E. However, many filters recognize this encoding and would still block the request. In a double encoding, the % in the above URL encoding would be encoded again as %25, resulting in %252E which some filters might not catch, but which could still be interpreted as a dot (.) by interpreters on the target.
• Subverting Environment Variable Values CAPEC-13 The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
• Format String Injection CAPEC-135 An adversary includes formatting characters in a string input field on the target application. Most applications assume that users will provide static text and may respond unpredictably to the presence of formatting character. For example, in certain functions of the C programming languages such as printf, the formatting character %s will print the contents of a memory location expecting this location to identify a string and the formatting character %n prints the number of DWORD written in the memory. An adversary can use this to read or write to memory locations or files, or simply to manipulate the value of the resulting text in unexpected ways. Reading or writing memory may result in program crashes and writing memory could result in the execution of arbitrary code if the adversary can write to the program stack.
• Client-side Injection-induced Buffer Overflow CAPEC-14 This type of attack exploits a buffer overflow vulnerability in targeted client software through injection of malicious content from a custom-built hostile service. This hostile service is created to deliver the correct content to the client software. For example, if the client-side application is a browser, the service will host a webpage that the browser loads.
• Filter Failure through Buffer Overflow CAPEC-24 In this attack, the idea is to cause an active filter to fail by causing an oversized transaction. An attacker may try to feed overly long input strings to the program in an attempt to overwhelm the filter (by causing a buffer overflow) and hoping that the filter does not fail securely (i.e. the user input is let into the system unfiltered).
• XML Injection CAPEC-250 An attacker utilizes crafted XML user-controllable input to probe, attack, and inject data into the XML database, using techniques similar to SQL injection. The user-controllable input can allow for unauthorized viewing of data, bypassing authentication or the front-end application for direct XML database access, and possibly altering database information.
• Leverage Alternate Encoding CAPEC-267 An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
• HTTP Response Smuggling CAPEC-273 An adversary manipulates and injects malicious content in the form of secret unauthorized HTTP responses, into a single HTTP response from a vulnerable or compromised back-end HTTP agent (e.g., server). See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences. Modification/manipulation of HTTP message headers, request-line and body parameters to disrupt and interfere in the interpretation and parsing of HTTP message lengths/boundaries for consecutive HTTP messages by HTTP agents in a HTTP chain or network path.
• Fuzzing CAPEC-28 In this attack pattern, the adversary leverages fuzzing to try to identify weaknesses in the system. Fuzzing is a software security and functionality testing method that feeds randomly constructed input to the system and looks for an indication that a failure in response to that input has occurred. Fuzzing treats the system as a black box and is totally free from any preconceptions or assumptions about the system. Fuzzing can help an attacker discover certain assumptions made about user input in the system. Fuzzing gives an attacker a quick way of potentially uncovering some of these assumptions despite not necessarily knowing anything about the internals of the system. These assumptions can then be turned against the system by specially crafting user input that may allow an attacker to achieve their goals.
• Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters CAPEC-3 Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.
• HTTP Response Splitting CAPEC-34 An adversary manipulates and injects malicious content, in the form of secret unauthorized HTTP responses, into a single HTTP response from a vulnerable or compromised back-end HTTP agent (e.g., web server) or into an already spoofed HTTP response from an adversary controlled domain/site. See CanPrecede relationships for possible consequences.
• MIME Conversion CAPEC-42 An attacker exploits a weakness in the MIME conversion routine to cause a buffer overflow and gain control over the mail server machine. The MIME system is designed to allow various different information formats to be interpreted and sent via e-mail. Attack points exist when data are converted to MIME compatible format and back.
• Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers CAPEC-43 An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
• Buffer Overflow via Symbolic Links CAPEC-45 This type of attack leverages the use of symbolic links to cause buffer overflows. An adversary can try to create or manipulate a symbolic link file such that its contents result in out of bounds data. When the target software processes the symbolic link file, it could potentially overflow internal buffers with insufficient bounds checking.
• Overflow Variables and Tags CAPEC-46 This type of attack leverages the use of tags or variables from a formatted configuration data to cause buffer overflow. The adversary crafts a malicious HTML page or configuration file that includes oversized strings, thus causing an overflow.
• Buffer Overflow via Parameter Expansion CAPEC-47 In this attack, the target software is given input that the adversary knows will be modified and expanded in size during processing. This attack relies on the target software failing to anticipate that the expanded data may exceed some internal limit, thereby creating a buffer overflow.
• Poison Web Service Registry CAPEC-51 SOA and Web Services often use a registry to perform look up, get schema information, and metadata about services. A poisoned registry can redirect (think phishing for servers) the service requester to a malicious service provider, provide incorrect information in schema or metadata, and delete information about service provider interfaces.
• Embedding NULL Bytes CAPEC-52 An adversary embeds one or more null bytes in input to the target software. This attack relies on the usage of a null-valued byte as a string terminator in many environments. The goal is for certain components of the target software to stop processing the input when it encounters the null byte(s).
• Postfix, Null Terminate, and Backslash CAPEC-53 If a string is passed through a filter of some kind, then a terminal NULL may not be valid. Using alternate representation of NULL allows an adversary to embed the NULL mid-string while postfixing the proper data so that the filter is avoided. One example is a filter that looks for a trailing slash character. If a string insertion is possible, but the slash must exist, an alternate encoding of NULL in mid-string may be used.
• Argument Injection CAPEC-6 An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
• Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-64 This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
• String Format Overflow in syslog() CAPEC-67 This attack targets applications and software that uses the syslog() function insecurely. If an application does not explicitely use a format string parameter in a call to syslog(), user input can be placed in the format string parameter leading to a format string injection attack. Adversaries can then inject malicious format string commands into the function call leading to a buffer overflow. There are many reported software vulnerabilities with the root cause being a misuse of the syslog() function.
• Blind SQL Injection CAPEC-7 Blind SQL Injection results from an insufficient mitigation for SQL Injection. Although suppressing database error messages are considered best practice, the suppression alone is not sufficient to prevent SQL Injection. Blind SQL Injection is a form of SQL Injection that overcomes the lack of error messages. Without the error messages that facilitate SQL Injection, the adversary constructs input strings that probe the target through simple Boolean SQL expressions. The adversary can determine if the syntax and structure of the injection was successful based on whether the query was executed or not. Applied iteratively, the adversary determines how and where the target is vulnerable to SQL Injection.
• Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-71 An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.
• URL Encoding CAPEC-72 This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
• Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls CAPEC-76 An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
• Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-78 This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
• Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding CAPEC-79 This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
• Buffer Overflow in an API Call CAPEC-8 This attack targets libraries or shared code modules which are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks. An adversary who has knowledge of known vulnerable libraries or shared code can easily target software that makes use of these libraries. All clients that make use of the code library thus become vulnerable by association. This has a very broad effect on security across a system, usually affecting more than one software process.
• Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-80 This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.
• XPath Injection CAPEC-83 An attacker can craft special user-controllable input consisting of XPath expressions to inject the XML database and bypass authentication or glean information that they normally would not be able to. XPath Injection enables an attacker to talk directly to the XML database, thus bypassing the application completely. XPath Injection results from the failure of an application to properly sanitize input used as part of dynamic XPath expressions used to query an XML database.
• XQuery Injection CAPEC-84 This attack utilizes XQuery to probe and attack server systems; in a similar manner that SQL Injection allows an attacker to exploit SQL calls to RDBMS, XQuery Injection uses improperly validated data that is passed to XQuery commands to traverse and execute commands that the XQuery routines have access to. XQuery injection can be used to enumerate elements on the victim's environment, inject commands to the local host, or execute queries to remote files and data sources.
• Buffer Overflow in Local Command-Line Utilities CAPEC-9 This attack targets command-line utilities available in a number of shells. An adversary can leverage a vulnerability found in a command-line utility to escalate privilege to root.

Vulnerable Configurations

• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:1.0.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.0:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.1:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.1:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.3:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.3:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.1.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20151111:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20151111:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20151229:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20151229:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160102:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160102:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160113:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160113:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160206:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160206:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160313:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160313:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160422:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160422:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160426:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160426:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160510:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160510:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160523:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:2.9.20160523:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.0:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.0:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.1:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.1:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.2:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.2:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.3:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.3:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.4:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.4:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.4:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.4:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.5:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.5:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.6:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.6:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.6:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.6:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.7:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.7:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.8:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.8:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.8:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.8:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.9:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.9:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.9:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.9:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.10:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.10:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.10:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.10:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.11:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.11:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.11:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.11:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.12:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.12:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.12:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.12:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.13:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.13:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.13:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.13:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.14:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.14:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.14:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.14:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.15:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.15:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.15:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.15:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.20160531:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.0.20160531:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta5:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta5:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta6:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta6:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta7:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta7:*:*:*:*:*:*
• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta8:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta9:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.0:beta10:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.2:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.2:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.4:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.5:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.6:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.6:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.1.6:beta5:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta5:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta6:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta7:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta8:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.0:beta9:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.1:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.1:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.1:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.1:beta5:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.1:beta6:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.2:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.2:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.3:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.4:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.4:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.4:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.5:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.6:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.6:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.6:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.7:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.7:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.7:beta4:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.8:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.8:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.2.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta3:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta5:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta6:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta7:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta8:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta9:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta11:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta12:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta13:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta14:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.0:beta15:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.2:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.4:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.4:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
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• cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  cpe:2.3:a:iterm2:iterm2:3.3.5:-:*:*:*:*:*:*

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