Focus on smarsh vulnerabilities and metrics.
Last updated: 25 Nov 2025, 23:25 UTC
This page consolidates all known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) associated with smarsh. We track both calendar-based metrics (using fixed periods) and rolling metrics (using gliding windows) to give you a comprehensive view of security trends and risk evolution. Use these insights to assess risk and plan your patching strategy.
For a broader perspective on cybersecurity threats, explore the comprehensive list of CVEs by vendor and product. Stay updated on critical vulnerabilities affecting major software and hardware providers.
Total smarsh CVEs: 8
Earliest CVE date: 08 May 2025, 14:15 UTC
Latest CVE date: 28 May 2025, 17:15 UTC
Latest CVE reference: CVE-2025-48931
30-day Count (Rolling): 0
365-day Count (Rolling): 8
Calendar-based Variation
Calendar-based Variation compares a fixed calendar period (e.g., this month versus the same month last year), while Rolling Growth Rate uses a continuous window (e.g., last 30 days versus the previous 30 days) to capture trends independent of calendar boundaries.
Month Variation (Calendar): 0%
Year Variation (Calendar): 0%
Month Growth Rate (30-day Rolling): 0.0%
Year Growth Rate (365-day Rolling): 0.0%
Average CVSS: 0.0
Max CVSS: 0
Critical CVEs (≥9): 0
| Range | Count |
|---|---|
| 0.0-3.9 | 8 |
| 4.0-6.9 | 0 |
| 7.0-8.9 | 0 |
| 9.0-10.0 | 0 |
These are the five CVEs with the highest CVSS scores for smarsh, sorted by severity first and recency.
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort.
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversary through various avenues.
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time) that can be reused at a later date if discovered by an adversary.
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers.
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential.
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password.