Focus on pyjwt_project vulnerabilities and metrics.
Last updated: 16 Jan 2026, 23:25 UTC
This page consolidates all known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) associated with pyjwt_project. We track both calendar-based metrics (using fixed periods) and rolling metrics (using gliding windows) to give you a comprehensive view of security trends and risk evolution. Use these insights to assess risk and plan your patching strategy.
For a broader perspective on cybersecurity threats, explore the comprehensive list of CVEs by vendor and product. Stay updated on critical vulnerabilities affecting major software and hardware providers.
Total pyjwt_project CVEs: 4
Earliest CVE date: 24 Aug 2017, 16:29 UTC
Latest CVE date: 31 Jul 2025, 21:15 UTC
Latest CVE reference: CVE-2025-45768
30-day Count (Rolling): 0
365-day Count (Rolling): 1
Calendar-based Variation
Calendar-based Variation compares a fixed calendar period (e.g., this month versus the same month last year), while Rolling Growth Rate uses a continuous window (e.g., last 30 days versus the previous 30 days) to capture trends independent of calendar boundaries.
Month Variation (Calendar): 0%
Year Variation (Calendar): 0.0%
Month Growth Rate (30-day Rolling): 0.0%
Year Growth Rate (365-day Rolling): 0.0%
Average CVSS: 2.5
Max CVSS: 5.0
Critical CVEs (≥9): 0
| Range | Count |
|---|---|
| 0.0-3.9 | 2 |
| 4.0-6.9 | 2 |
| 7.0-8.9 | 0 |
| 9.0-10.0 | 0 |
These are the five CVEs with the highest CVSS scores for pyjwt_project, sorted by severity first and recency.
pyjwt v2.10.1 was discovered to contain weak encryption. NOTE: this is disputed by the Supplier because the key length is chosen by the application that uses the library (admittedly, library users may benefit from a minimum value and a mechanism for opting in to strict enforcement).
pyjwt is a JSON Web Token implementation in Python. An incorrect string comparison is run for `iss` checking, resulting in `"acb"` being accepted for `"_abc_"`. This is a bug introduced in version 2.10.0: checking the "iss" claim changed from `isinstance(issuer, list)` to `isinstance(issuer, Sequence)`. Since str is a Sequnce, but not a list, `in` is also used for string comparison. This results in `if "abc" not in "__abcd__":` being checked instead of `if "abc" != "__abc__":`. Signature checks are still present so real world impact is likely limited to denial of service scenarios. This issue has been patched in version 2.10.1. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
PyJWT is a Python implementation of RFC 7519. PyJWT supports multiple different JWT signing algorithms. With JWT, an attacker submitting the JWT token can choose the used signing algorithm. The PyJWT library requires that the application chooses what algorithms are supported. The application can specify `jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms()` to get support for all algorithms, or specify a single algorithm. The issue is not that big as `algorithms=jwt.algorithms.get_default_algorithms()` has to be used. Users should upgrade to v2.4.0 to receive a patch for this issue. As a workaround, always be explicit with the algorithms that are accepted and expected when decoding.
In PyJWT 1.5.0 and below the `invalid_strings` check in `HMACAlgorithm.prepare_key` does not account for all PEM encoded public keys. Specifically, the PKCS1 PEM encoded format would be allowed because it is prefaced with the string `-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----` which is not accounted for. This enables symmetric/asymmetric key confusion attacks against users using the PKCS1 PEM encoded public keys, which would allow an attacker to craft JWTs from scratch.