mintplexlabs CVE Vulnerabilities & Metrics

mintplex-labs/anything-llm version latest contains a vulnerability where sensitive information, specifically a password, is improperly stored within a JWT (JSON Web Token) used as a bearer token in single user mode. When decoded, the JWT reveals the password in plaintext. This improper storage of sensitive information poses significant security risks, as an attacker who gains access to the JWT can easily decode it and retrieve the password. The issue is fixed in version 1.0.3.

In mintplex-labs/anything-llm versions up to and including 1.5.3, an issue was discovered where the password hash of a user is returned in the response after login (`POST /api/request-token`) and after account creations (`POST /api/admin/users/new`). This exposure occurs because the entire User object, including the bcrypt password hash, is included in the response sent to the frontend. This practice could potentially lead to sensitive information exposure despite the use of bcrypt, a strong hashing algorithm. It is recommended not to expose any clues about passwords to the frontend.

mintplex-labs/anything-llm is affected by an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in its upload file endpoint, leading to a denial of service (DOS) condition. Specifically, the server can be shut down by sending an invalid upload request. An attacker with the ability to upload documents can exploit this vulnerability to cause a DOS condition by manipulating the upload request.

In mintplex-labs/anything-llm, a vulnerability exists in the thread update process that allows users with Default or Manager roles to escalate their privileges to Administrator. The issue arises from improper input validation when handling HTTP POST requests to the endpoint `/workspace/:slug/thread/:threadSlug/update`. Specifically, the application fails to validate or check user input before passing it to the `workspace_thread` Prisma model for execution. This oversight allows attackers to craft a Prisma relation query operation that manipulates the `users` model to change a user's role to admin. Successful exploitation grants attackers the highest level of user privileges, enabling them to see and perform all actions within the system.

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the upload link feature of mintplex-labs/anything-llm. This feature, intended for users with manager or admin roles, processes uploaded links through an internal Collector API using a headless browser. An attacker can exploit this by hosting a malicious website and using it to perform actions such as internal port scanning, accessing internal web applications not exposed externally, and interacting with the Collector API. This interaction can lead to unauthorized actions such as arbitrary file deletion and limited Local File Inclusion (LFI), including accessing NGINX access logs which may contain sensitive information.

A stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm application, affecting versions up to and including the latest before 1.0.0. The vulnerability arises from the application's failure to properly sanitize and validate user-supplied URLs before embedding them into the application UI as external links with custom icons. Specifically, the application does not prevent the inclusion of 'javascript:' protocol payloads in URLs, which can be exploited by a user with manager role to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the context of another user's session. This flaw can be leveraged to steal the admin's authorization token by crafting malicious URLs that, when clicked by the admin, send the token to an attacker-controlled server. The attacker can then use this token to perform unauthorized actions, escalate privileges to admin, or directly take over the admin account. The vulnerability is triggered when the malicious link is opened in a new tab using either the CTRL + left mouse button click or the mouse scroll wheel click, or in some non-updated versions of modern browsers, by directly clicking on the link.

A JSON Injection vulnerability exists in the `mintplex-labs/anything-llm` application, specifically within the username parameter during the login process at the `/api/request-token` endpoint. The vulnerability arises from improper handling of values, allowing attackers to perform brute force attacks without prior knowledge of the username. Once the password is known, attackers can conduct blind attacks to ascertain the full username, significantly compromising system security.

mintplex-labs/anything-llm is vulnerable to multiple security issues due to improper input validation in several endpoints. An attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to escalate privileges from a default user role to an admin role, read and delete arbitrary files on the system, and perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. The vulnerabilities are present in the `/request-token`, `/workspace/:slug/thread/:threadSlug/update`, `/system/remove-logo`, `/system/logo`, and collector's `/process` endpoints. These issues are due to the application's failure to properly validate user input before passing it to `prisma` functions and other critical operations. Affected versions include the latest version prior to 1.0.0.

A remote code execution vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm due to improper handling of environment variables. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by injecting arbitrary environment variables via the `POST /api/system/update-env` endpoint, which allows for the execution of arbitrary code on the host running anything-llm. The vulnerability is present in the latest version of anything-llm, with the latest commit identified as fde905aac1812b84066ff72e5f2f90b56d4c3a59. This issue has been fixed in version 1.0.0. Successful exploitation could lead to code execution on the host, enabling attackers to read and modify data accessible to the user running the service, potentially leading to a denial of service.

An improper authorization vulnerability exists in the mintplex-labs/anything-llm application, specifically within the '/api/v/' endpoint and its sub-routes. This flaw allows unauthenticated users to perform destructive actions on the VectorDB, including resetting the database and deleting specific namespaces, without requiring any authorization or permissions. The issue affects all versions up to and including the latest version, with a fix introduced in version 1.0.0. Exploitation of this vulnerability can lead to complete data loss of document embeddings across all workspaces, rendering workspace chats and embeddable chat widgets non-functional. Additionally, attackers can list all namespaces, potentially exposing private workspace names.

A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in the latest version of mintplex-labs/anything-llm, allowing attackers to bypass the official fix intended to restrict access to intranet IP addresses and protocols. Despite efforts to filter out intranet IP addresses starting with 192, 172, 10, and 127 through regular expressions and limit access protocols to HTTP and HTTPS, attackers can still bypass these restrictions using alternative representations of IP addresses and accessing other ports running on localhost. This vulnerability enables attackers to access any asset on the internal network, attack web services on the internal network, scan hosts on the internal network, and potentially access AWS metadata endpoints. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied URLs, which can be exploited to perform SSRF attacks.

As a default user on a multi-user instance of AnythingLLM, you could execute a call to the `/export-data` endpoint of the system and then unzip and read that export that would enable you do exfiltrate data of the system at that save state. This would require the attacked to be granted explicit access to the system, but they can do this at any role. Additionally, post-download, the data is deleted so no evidence would exist that the exfiltration occured.

If an attacked was given access to an instance with the admin or manager role there is no backend authentication that would prevent the attacked from creating a new user with an `admin` role and then be able to use this new account to have elevated privileges on the instance

A user who is privileged already `manager` or `admin` can set their profile picture via the frontend API using a relative filepath to then user the PFP GET API to download any valid files. The attacker would have to have been granted privileged permissions to the system before executing this attack.

A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in mintplex-labs/anything-llm, allowing users with 'default' role to delete documents uploaded by 'admin'. Despite the intended restriction that prevents 'default' role users from deleting admin-uploaded documents, an attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a crafted DELETE request to the /api/system/remove-document endpoint. This vulnerability is due to improper access control checks, enabling unauthorized document deletion and potentially leading to loss of data integrity.

The inclusion of the web scraper for AnythingLLM means that any user with the proper authorization level (manager, admin, and when in single user) could put in the URL ``` http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance ``` which is a special IP and URL that resolves only when the request comes from within an EC2 instance. This would allow the user to see the connection/secret credentials for their specific instance and be able to manage it regardless of who deployed it. The user would have to have pre-existing knowledge of the hosting infra which the target instance is deployed on, but if sent - would resolve if on EC2 and the proper `iptable` or firewall rule is not configured for their setup.

Attacker, with permission to submit a link or submits a link via POST to be collected that is using the file:// protocol can then introspect host files and other relatively stored files.

User can send a chat that contains an XSS opportunity that will then run when the chat is sent and on subsequent page loads. Given the minimum requirement for a user to send a chat is to be given access to a workspace via an admin the risk is low. Additionally, the location in which the XSS renders is only limited to the user who submits the XSS. Ultimately, this attack is limited to the user attacking themselves. There is no anonymous chat submission unless the user does not take the minimum steps required to protect their instance.

Authentication bypass in vector-admin allows a user to register to a vector-admin server while “domain restriction” is active, even when not owning an authorized email address.

AnythingLLM is an application that turns any document, resource, or piece of content into context that any LLM can use as references during chatting. In versions prior to commit `08d33cfd8` an unauthenticated API route (file export) can allow attacker to crash the server resulting in a denial of service attack. The “data-export” endpoint is used to export files using the filename parameter as user input. The endpoint takes the user input, filters it to avoid directory traversal attacks, fetches the file from the server, and afterwards deletes it. An attacker can trick the input filter mechanism to point to the current directory, and while attempting to delete it the server will crash as there is no error-handling wrapper around it. Moreover, the endpoint is public and does not require any form of authentication, resulting in an unauthenticated Denial of Service issue, which crashes the instance using a single HTTP packet. This issue has been addressed in commit `08d33cfd8`. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Improper Access Control in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.1.0.

Improper Input Validation in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.1.0.

Relative Path Traversal in GitHub repository mintplex-labs/anything-llm prior to 0.0.1.