medtronic CVE Vulnerabilities & Metrics

Deserialization of untrusted data in Microsoft Messaging Queuing Service in Medtronic's Paceart Optima versions 1.11 and earlier on Windows allows an unauthorized user to impact a healthcare delivery organization’s Paceart Optima system cardiac device causing data to be deleted, stolen, or modified, or the Paceart Optima system being used for further network penetration via network connectivity.

Medtronic identified that the Pelvic Health clinician apps, which are installed on the Smart Programmer mobile device, have a password vulnerability that requires a security update to fix. Not updating could potentially result in unauthorized control of the clinician therapy application, which has greater control over therapy parameters than the patient app. Changes still cannot be made outside of the established therapy parameters of the programmer. For unauthorized access to occur, an individual would need physical access to the Smart Programmer.

A vulnerability exists which could allow an unauthorized user to learn aspects of the communication protocol used to pair system components while the pump is being paired with other system components. Exploitation requires nearby wireless signal proximity with the patient and the device; advanced technical knowledge is required for exploitation. Please refer to the Medtronic Product Security Bulletin for guidance

Medtronic MyCareLink Smart 25000 is vulnerable to a race condition in the MCL Smart Patient Reader software update system, which allows unsigned firmware to be uploaded and executed on the Patient Reader. If exploited, an attacker could remotely execute code on the MCL Smart Patient Reader device, leading to control of the device.

Medtronic MyCareLink Smart 25000 is  vulnerable when an authenticated attacker runs a debug command, which can be sent to the patient reader and cause a heap overflow event within the MCL Smart Patient Reader software stack. The heap overflow could allow an attacker to remotely execute code on the MCL Smart Patient Reader, potentially leading to control of the device

Medtronic MyCareLink Smart 25000 contains an authentication protocol vulnerability where the method used to authenticate between the MCL Smart Patient Reader and the Medtronic MyCareLink Smart mobile app is vulnerable to bypass. This vulnerability enables an attacker to use another mobile device or malicious application on the patient’s smartphone to authenticate to the patient’s Medtronic Smart Reader, fooling the device into believing it is communicating with the original Medtronic smart phone application when executed within range of Bluetooth communication.

Medtronic Valleylab Exchange Client version 3.4 and below, Valleylab FT10 Energy Platform (VLFT10GEN) software version 4.0.0 and below, and Valleylab FX8 Energy Platform (VLFX8GEN) software version 1.1.0 and below use multiple sets of hard-coded credentials. If discovered, they can be used to read files on the device.

Medtronic Valleylab Exchange Client version 3.4 and below, Valleylab FT10 Energy Platform (VLFT10GEN) software version 4.0.0 and below, and Valleylab FX8 Energy Platform (VLFX8GEN) software version 1.1.0 and below use the descrypt algorithm for OS password hashing. While interactive, network-based logons are disabled, and attackers can use the other vulnerabilities within this report to obtain local shell access and access these hashes.

In Medtronic Valleylab FT10 Energy Platform (VLFT10GEN) version 2.1.0 and lower and version 2.0.3 and lower, and Valleylab LS10 Energy Platform (VLLS10GEN—not available in the United States) version 1.20.2 and lower, the RFID security mechanism does not apply read protection, allowing for full read access of the RFID security mechanism data.

In Medtronic Valleylab FT10 Energy Platform (VLFT10GEN) version 2.1.0 and lower and version 2.0.3 and lower, and Valleylab LS10 Energy Platform (VLLS10GEN—not available in the United States) version 1.20.2 and lower, the RFID security mechanism used for authentication between the FT10/LS10 Energy Platform and instruments can be bypassed, allowing for inauthentic instruments to connect to the generator.

Medtronic MiniMed Insulin Pumps are designed to communicate using a wireless RF with other devices, such as blood glucose meters, glucose sensor transmitters, and CareLink USB devices. This wireless RF communication protocol does not properly implement authentication or authorization. An attacker with adjacent access to one of the affected insulin pump models can inject, replay, modify, and/or intercept data. This vulnerability could also allow attackers to change pump settings and control insulin delivery.

The Conexus telemetry protocol utilized within Medtronic MyCareLink Monitor versions 24950 and 24952, CareLink Monitor version 2490C, CareLink 2090 Programmer, Amplia CRT-D, Claria CRT-D, Compia CRT-D, Concerto CRT-D, Concerto II CRT-D, Consulta CRT-D, Evera ICD, Maximo II CRT-D and ICD, Mirro ICD, Nayamed ND ICD, Primo ICD, Protecta ICD and CRT-D, Secura ICD, Virtuoso ICD, Virtuoso II ICD, Visia AF ICD, and Viva CRT-D does not implement encryption. An attacker with adjacent short-range access to a target product can listen to communications, including the transmission of sensitive data.

The Conexus telemetry protocol utilized within Medtronic MyCareLink Monitor versions 24950 and 24952, CareLink Monitor version 2490C, CareLink 2090 Programmer, Amplia CRT-D, Claria CRT-D, Compia CRT-D, Concerto CRT-D, Concerto II CRT-D, Consulta CRT-D, Evera ICD, Maximo II CRT-D and ICD, Mirro ICD, Nayamed ND ICD, Primo ICD, Protecta ICD and CRT-D, Secura ICD, Virtuoso ICD, Virtuoso II ICD, Visia AF ICD, and Viva CRT-D does not implement authentication or authorization. An attacker with adjacent short-range access to an affected product, in situations where the product’s radio is turned on, can inject, replay, modify, and/or intercept data within the telemetry communication. This communication protocol provides the ability to read and write memory values to affected implanted cardiac devices; therefore, an attacker could exploit this communication protocol to change memory in the implanted cardiac device.

Medtronic CareLink and Encore Programmers do not encrypt or do not sufficiently encrypt sensitive PII and PHI information while at rest .

Communications between Medtronic MiniMed MMT pumps and wireless accessories are transmitted in cleartext. A sufficiently skilled attacker could capture these transmissions and extract sensitive information, such as device serial numbers.

Medtronic MyCareLink Patient Monitor’s update service does not sufficiently verify the authenticity of the data uploaded. An attacker who obtains per-product credentials from the monitor and paired implantable cardiac device information can potentially upload invalid data to the Medtronic CareLink network.

Medtronic MyCareLink Patient Monitor uses per-product credentials that are stored in a recoverable format. An attacker can use these credentials for network authentication and encryption of local data at rest.

Medtronic N'Vision Clinician Programmer 8840 N'Vision Clinician Programmer and 8870 N'Vision removable application card does not encrypt PII and PHI while at rest.

Medtronic 24950 MyCareLink Monitor and 24952 MyCareLink Monitor contains a hard-coded operating system password. An attacker with physical access can remove the case of the device, connect to the debug port, and use the password to gain privileged access to the operating system.

Medtronic 24950 MyCareLink Monitor and 24952 MyCareLink Monitor contains debug code meant to test the functionality of the monitor's communication interfaces, including the interface between the monitor and implantable cardiac device. An attacker with physical access to the device can exploit other vulnerabilities to access this debug functionality. This debug functionality provides the ability to read and write arbitrary memory values to implantable cardiac devices via inductive or short range wireless protocols. An attacker with close physical proximity to a target implantable cardiac device can use this debug functionality.

Medtronic 2090 CareLink Programmer uses a virtual private network connection to securely download updates. It does not verify it is still connected to this virtual private network before downloading updates. The affected products initially establish an encapsulated IP-based VPN connection to a Medtronic-hosted update network. Once the VPN is established, it makes a request to a HTTP (non-TLS) server across the VPN for updates, which responds and provides any available updates. The programmer-side (client) service responsible for this HTTP request does not check to ensure it is still connected to the VPN before making the HTTP request. Thus, an attacker could cause the VPN connection to terminate (through various methods and attack points) and intercept the HTTP request, responding with malicious updates via a man-in-the-middle attack. The affected products do not verify the origin or integrity of these updates, as it insufficiently relied on the security of the VPN. An attacker with remote network access to the programmer could influence these communications.

Medtronic N'Vision Clinician Programmer 8840 N'Vision Clinician Programmer, all versions, and 8870 N'Vision removable Application Card, all versions does not encrypt PII and PHI while at rest.

Medtronic 2090 CareLink Programmer’s software deployment network contains a directory traversal vulnerability that could allow an attacker to read files on the system.

Medtronic 2090 CareLink Programmer uses a per-product username and password that is stored in a recoverable format.

Unspecified vulnerability in Medtronic Paradigm wireless insulin pump 512, 522, 712, and 722 allows remote attackers to modify the delivery of an insulin bolus dose and cause a denial of service (adverse human health effects) via unspecified vectors involving wireless communications and knowledge of the device's serial number, as demonstrated by Jerome Radcliffe at the Black Hat USA conference in August 2011. NOTE: the vendor has disputed the severity of this issue, saying "we believe the risk of deliberate, malicious, or unauthorized manipulation of medical devices is extremely low... we strongly believe it would be extremely difficult for a third-party to wirelessly tamper with your insulin pump... you would be able to detect tones on the insulin pump that weren't intentionally programmed and could intervene accordingly."