Focus on endress vulnerabilities and metrics.
Last updated: 15 Feb 2026, 23:25 UTC
This page consolidates all known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) associated with endress. We track both calendar-based metrics (using fixed periods) and rolling metrics (using gliding windows) to give you a comprehensive view of security trends and risk evolution. Use these insights to assess risk and plan your patching strategy.
For a broader perspective on cybersecurity threats, explore the comprehensive list of CVEs by vendor and product. Stay updated on critical vulnerabilities affecting major software and hardware providers.
Total endress CVEs: 8
Earliest CVE date: 07 Sep 2018, 22:29 UTC
Latest CVE date: 03 Jul 2025, 12:15 UTC
Latest CVE reference: CVE-2025-27461
30-day Count (Rolling): 0
365-day Count (Rolling): 6
Calendar-based Variation
Calendar-based Variation compares a fixed calendar period (e.g., this month versus the same month last year), while Rolling Growth Rate uses a continuous window (e.g., last 30 days versus the previous 30 days) to capture trends independent of calendar boundaries.
Month Variation (Calendar): 0%
Year Variation (Calendar): 500.0%
Month Growth Rate (30-day Rolling): 0.0%
Year Growth Rate (365-day Rolling): 500.0%
Average CVSS: 0.62
Max CVSS: 5.0
Critical CVEs (≥9): 0
| Range | Count |
|---|---|
| 0.0-3.9 | 7 |
| 4.0-6.9 | 1 |
| 7.0-8.9 | 0 |
| 9.0-10.0 | 0 |
These are the five CVEs with the highest CVSS scores for endress, sorted by severity first and recency.
During startup, the device automatically logs in the EPC2 Windows user without requesting a password.
The hard drives of the device are not encrypted using a full volume encryption feature such as BitLocker. This allows an attacker with physical access to the device to use an alternative operating system to interact with the hard drives, completely circumventing the Windows login. The attacker can read from and write to all files on the hard drives.
The VNC application stores its passwords encrypted within the registry but uses DES for encryption. As DES is broken, the original passwords can be recovered.
The VNC authentication mechanism bases on a challenge-response system where both server and client use the same password for encryption. The challenge is sent from the server to the client, is encrypted by the client and sent back. The server does the same encryption locally and if the responses match it is prooven that the client knows the correct password. Since all VNC communication is unencrypted, an attacker can obtain the challenge and response and try to derive the password from this information.
All communication between the VNC server and client(s) is unencrypted. This allows an attacker to intercept the traffic and obtain sensitive data.
The SMB server's login mechanism does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame, making it susceptible to brute-force attacks.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can run malicious c# code included in curve files and execute commands in the users context.
Endress+Hauser WirelessHART Fieldgate SWG70 3.x devices allow Directory Traversal via the fcgi-bin/wgsetcgi filename parameter.