CVE-2026-64586 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Details

CVE-2026-64586 Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2026-64586: In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -> brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock; resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe. Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr (bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate. The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit), SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released those DMA buffers. This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

CVE-2026-64586 References

External References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration

Unknown

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