CVE-2026-49414 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Details

CVE-2026-49414 Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2026-49414: The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather than before. As a result, a user-requested ASLR disable was still in effect at the point where the base address was chosen. An unprivileged local user can disable ASLR for a setuid PIE binary by calling procctl(2) before execve(2). This makes exploitation of any separate memory corruption vulnerability in that binary significantly easier.

CVE-2026-49414 References

External References

• https://security.freebsd.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-26:32.elf.asc

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

• Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input Filters CAPEC-3 Some APIs will strip certain leading characters from a string of parameters. An adversary can intentionally introduce leading "ghost" characters (extra characters that don't affect the validity of the request at the API layer) that enable the input to pass the filters and therefore process the adversary's input. This occurs when the targeted API will accept input data in several syntactic forms and interpret it in the equivalent semantic way, while the filter does not take into account the full spectrum of the syntactic forms acceptable to the targeted API.
• Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers CAPEC-43 An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
• Using Unicode Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic CAPEC-71 An attacker may provide a Unicode string to a system component that is not Unicode aware and use that to circumvent the filter or cause the classifying mechanism to fail to properly understanding the request. That may allow the attacker to slip malicious data past the content filter and/or possibly cause the application to route the request incorrectly.

Other 5 Recently Published CVEs Vulnerabilities

• CVE-2026-49416 – The CONS_HISTORY ioctl handler did not adequately validate the requested history size. A large value caused an integer overflow in the buffer size...
• CVE-2026-49414 – The ELF image activator cleared per-process ASLR preference flags for setuid binaries after the code that computes the PIE base address, rather tha...
• CVE-2026-49417 – Second, the audio buffer backing a mapping could be freed when the device was closed even though the mapping remained valid. The freed memory coul...
• CVE-2026-49413 – The Linuxulator determined whether a binary was set-user-ID or set-group-ID by checking the P_SUGID process flag. During execve(2), this flag is n...
• CVE-2026-49412 – The kernel handler for IPV6_MSFILTER dropped a serializing lock in order to copy the source-filter list from userspace, then reacquired the lock. ...