CVE-2026-28402 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Details

CVE-2026-28402
Vulnerability Scoring

7.1
/10
Very High Risk

Highly exploitable, CVE-2026-28402 poses a critical security risk that could lead to severe breaches.

Attack Complexity Details

  • Attack Complexity: Low
    Exploits can be performed without significant complexity or special conditions.
  • Attack Vector: Network
    Vulnerability is exploitable over a network without physical access.
  • Privileges Required: Low
    Some privileges are necessary to exploit the vulnerability.
  • Scope: Unchanged
    Exploit remains within the originally vulnerable component.
  • User Interaction: None
    No user interaction is necessary for exploitation.

CVE-2026-28402 Details

Status: Analyzed

Last updated: 🕑 04 May 2026, 14:25 UTC
Originally published on: 🕙 27 Feb 2026, 22:16 UTC

Time between publication and last update: 65 days

CVSS Release: version 3

CVSS3 Source

security-advisories@github.com

CVSS3 Type

Secondary

CVSS3 Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H

CVE-2026-28402 Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2026-28402: nimiq/core-rs-albatross is a Rust implementation of the Nimiq Proof-of-Stake protocol based on the Albatross consensus algorithm. Prior to version 1.2.2, a malicious or compromised validator that is elected as proposer can publish a macro block proposal where `header.body_root` does not match the actual macro body hash. The proposal can pass proposal verification because the macro proposal verification path validates the header but does not validate the binding `body_root == hash(body)`; later code expects this binding and may panic on mismatch, crashing validators. Note that the impact is only for validator nodes. The patch for this vulnerability is formally released as part of v1.2.2. The patch adds the corresponding body root verification in the proposal checks. No known workarounds are available.

Assessing the Risk of CVE-2026-28402

Access Complexity Graph

The exploitability of CVE-2026-28402 depends on two key factors: attack complexity (the level of effort required to execute an exploit) and privileges required (the access level an attacker needs).

Exploitability Analysis for CVE-2026-28402

CVE-2026-28402 presents an accessible attack vector with minimal effort required. Restricting access controls and implementing security updates are critical to reducing exploitation risks.

Understanding AC and PR

A lower complexity and fewer privilege requirements make exploitation easier. Security teams should evaluate these aspects to determine the urgency of mitigation strategies, such as patch management and access control policies.

Attack Complexity (AC) measures the difficulty in executing an exploit. A high AC means that specific conditions must be met, making an attack more challenging, while a low AC means the vulnerability can be exploited with minimal effort.

Privileges Required (PR) determine the level of system access necessary for an attack. Vulnerabilities requiring no privileges are more accessible to attackers, whereas high privilege requirements limit exploitation to authorized users with elevated access.

CVSS Score Breakdown Chart

Above is the CVSS Sub-score Breakdown for CVE-2026-28402, illustrating how Base, Impact, and Exploitability factors combine to form the overall severity rating. A higher sub-score typically indicates a more severe or easier-to-exploit vulnerability.

CIA Impact Analysis

Below is the Impact Analysis for CVE-2026-28402, showing how Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability might be affected if the vulnerability is exploited. Higher values usually signal greater potential damage.

  • Confidentiality: None
    CVE-2026-28402 has no significant impact on data confidentiality.
  • Integrity: Low
    Exploiting CVE-2026-28402 may cause minor changes to data without severely impacting its accuracy.
  • Availability: High
    CVE-2026-28402 can disrupt system operations, potentially causing complete denial of service (DoS).

CVE-2026-28402 References

External References

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-354

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

  • Checksum Spoofing CAPEC-145 An adversary spoofs a checksum message for the purpose of making a payload appear to have a valid corresponding checksum. Checksums are used to verify message integrity. They consist of some value based on the value of the message they are protecting. Hash codes are a common checksum mechanism. Both the sender and recipient are able to compute the checksum based on the contents of the message. If the message contents change between the sender and recipient, the sender and recipient will compute different checksum values. Since the sender's checksum value is transmitted with the message, the recipient would know that a modification occurred. In checksum spoofing an adversary modifies the message body and then modifies the corresponding checksum so that the recipient's checksum calculation will match the checksum (created by the adversary) in the message. This would prevent the recipient from realizing that a change occurred.
  • Padding Oracle Crypto Attack CAPEC-463 An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.
  • Manipulating Writeable Configuration Files CAPEC-75 Generally these are manually edited files that are not in the preview of the system administrators, any ability on the attackers' behalf to modify these files, for example in a CVS repository, gives unauthorized access directly to the application, the same as authorized users.

Vulnerable Configurations

  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:-:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:-:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:rc0:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:rc0:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:rc1:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:rc1:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:rc2:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:rc2:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:rc3:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.1.0:rc3:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.2.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.2.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.2.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.2.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.2.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.2.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.3.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.3.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.3.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.3.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.3.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.3.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.3.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.3.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.4.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.4.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.4.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.4.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.5.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.6.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.6.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.7.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.7.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.8.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.8.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.8.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.8.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.8.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.8.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.8.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.8.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.9.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.9.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.10.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.10.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.5:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.11.5:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.12.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.12.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.12.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.12.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.13.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.13.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.13.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.13.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.14.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.14.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.15.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.15.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.16.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.16.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.16.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.16.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.17.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.17.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.18.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.18.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.19.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.19.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.5:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.20.5:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.21.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.21.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.21.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.21.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.22.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.22.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.22.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.22.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.22.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.22.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.22.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.22.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.23.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.23.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:0.24.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:-:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:-:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc0:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc0:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc1:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc1:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc2:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc2:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc3:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc3:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc4:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc4:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc5:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.0:rc5:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.2:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.3:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.4:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.5:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.5:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.6:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.6:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.7:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.7:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.8:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.8:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.9:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.0.9:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.1.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.1.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.1.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.1.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.2.0:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:nimiq:nimiq_proof-of-stake:1.2.1:*:*:*:*:rust:*:*

Protect Your Infrastructure against CVE-2026-28402: Combat Critical CVE Threats

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Other 5 Recently Published CVEs Vulnerabilities

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  • CVE-2026-6909 – ATutor is vulnerable to Reflected XSS in /install/upgrade.php endpoint. An attacker can provide a specially crafted URL that, when opened, results ...
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