CVE-2024-41960 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Details

CVE-2024-41960
Vulnerability Scoring

4.8
/10
Medium Risk

The vulnerability CVE-2024-41960 could compromise system integrity but typically requires user interaction to be exploited.

Attack Complexity Details

  • Attack Complexity: Low
    Exploits can be performed without significant complexity or special conditions.
  • Attack Vector: Network
    Vulnerability is exploitable over a network without physical access.
  • Privileges Required: High
    High-level privileges are required for exploitation.
  • Scope: Changed
    Successful exploitation can impact components beyond the vulnerable component.
  • User Interaction: Required
    User interaction is necessary for successful exploitation.

CVE-2024-41960 Details

Status: Analyzed

Last updated: 🕗 19 Sep 2024, 20:01 UTC
Originally published on: 🕗 05 Aug 2024, 20:15 UTC

Time between publication and last update: 44 days

CVSS Release: version 3

CVSS3 Source

nvd@nist.gov

CVSS3 Type

Primary

CVSS3 Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

CVE-2024-41960 Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2024-41960: mailcow: dockerized is an open source groupware/email suite based on docker. An authenticated admin user can inject a JavaScript payload into the Relay Hosts configuration. The injected payload is executed whenever the configuration page is viewed, enabling the attacker to execute arbitrary scripts in the context of the user's browser. This could lead to data theft, or further exploitation. This issue has been addressed in the `2024-07` release. All users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.

Assessing the Risk of CVE-2024-41960

Access Complexity Graph

The exploitability of CVE-2024-41960 depends on two key factors: attack complexity (the level of effort required to execute an exploit) and privileges required (the access level an attacker needs).

Exploitability Analysis for CVE-2024-41960

The exploitability of CVE-2024-41960 is influenced by multiple factors. Security teams should analyze system configurations and apply appropriate countermeasures to mitigate threats.

Understanding AC and PR

A lower complexity and fewer privilege requirements make exploitation easier. Security teams should evaluate these aspects to determine the urgency of mitigation strategies, such as patch management and access control policies.

Attack Complexity (AC) measures the difficulty in executing an exploit. A high AC means that specific conditions must be met, making an attack more challenging, while a low AC means the vulnerability can be exploited with minimal effort.

Privileges Required (PR) determine the level of system access necessary for an attack. Vulnerabilities requiring no privileges are more accessible to attackers, whereas high privilege requirements limit exploitation to authorized users with elevated access.

CVSS Score Breakdown Chart

Above is the CVSS Sub-score Breakdown for CVE-2024-41960, illustrating how Base, Impact, and Exploitability factors combine to form the overall severity rating. A higher sub-score typically indicates a more severe or easier-to-exploit vulnerability.

CIA Impact Analysis

Below is the Impact Analysis for CVE-2024-41960, showing how Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability might be affected if the vulnerability is exploited. Higher values usually signal greater potential damage.

  • Confidentiality: Low
    CVE-2024-41960 could lead to minor leaks of non-critical information without major privacy breaches.
  • Integrity: Low
    Exploiting CVE-2024-41960 may cause minor changes to data without severely impacting its accuracy.
  • Availability: None
    CVE-2024-41960 does not impact system availability.

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

The EPSS score estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the near future.

EPSS Score: 0.045% (probability of exploit)

EPSS Percentile: 16.73% (lower percentile = lower relative risk)
This vulnerability is less risky than approximately 83.27% of others.

CVE-2024-41960 References

External References

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-79

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

  • XSS Using MIME Type Mismatch CAPEC-209 An adversary creates a file with scripting content but where the specified MIME type of the file is such that scripting is not expected. The adversary tricks the victim into accessing a URL that responds with the script file. Some browsers will detect that the specified MIME type of the file does not match the actual type of its content and will automatically switch to using an interpreter for the real content type. If the browser does not invoke script filters before doing this, the adversary's script may run on the target unsanitized, possibly revealing the victim's cookies or executing arbitrary script in their browser.
  • DOM-Based XSS CAPEC-588 This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is inserted into the client-side HTML being parsed by a web browser. Content served by a vulnerable web application includes script code used to manipulate the Document Object Model (DOM). This script code either does not properly validate input, or does not perform proper output encoding, thus creating an opportunity for an adversary to inject a malicious script launch a XSS attack. A key distinction between other XSS attacks and DOM-based attacks is that in other XSS attacks, the malicious script runs when the vulnerable web page is initially loaded, while a DOM-based attack executes sometime after the page loads. Another distinction of DOM-based attacks is that in some cases, the malicious script is never sent to the vulnerable web server at all. An attack like this is guaranteed to bypass any server-side filtering attempts to protect users.
  • Reflected XSS CAPEC-591 This type of attack is a form of Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is "reflected" off a vulnerable web application and then executed by a victim's browser. The process starts with an adversary delivering a malicious script to a victim and convincing the victim to send the script to the vulnerable web application.
  • Stored XSS CAPEC-592 An adversary utilizes a form of Cross-site Scripting (XSS) where a malicious script is persistently "stored" within the data storage of a vulnerable web application as valid input.
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) CAPEC-63 An adversary embeds malicious scripts in content that will be served to web browsers. The goal of the attack is for the target software, the client-side browser, to execute the script with the users' privilege level. An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute code and scripts. Web browsers, for example, have some simple security controls in place, but if a remote attacker is allowed to execute scripts (through injecting them in to user-generated content like bulletin boards) then these controls may be bypassed. Further, these attacks are very difficult for an end user to detect.
  • AJAX Footprinting CAPEC-85 This attack utilizes the frequent client-server roundtrips in Ajax conversation to scan a system. While Ajax does not open up new vulnerabilities per se, it does optimize them from an attacker point of view. A common first step for an attacker is to footprint the target environment to understand what attacks will work. Since footprinting relies on enumeration, the conversational pattern of rapid, multiple requests and responses that are typical in Ajax applications enable an attacker to look for many vulnerabilities, well-known ports, network locations and so on. The knowledge gained through Ajax fingerprinting can be used to support other attacks, such as XSS.

Vulnerable Configurations

  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.2.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.3.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.3.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.3.3:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.4:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.5:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.5.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.5.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.7:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.7.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.7.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.7.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.8:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.8.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.8.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.8.1.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.8.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.8.2:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.9:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.10.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.10.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.11:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.11:-:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.11:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.11:beta1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.11:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.11:beta2:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.13:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.13.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.13.1:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:0.14:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-01a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-01a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-03:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-03:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-03a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-03a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-04:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-04:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05c:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05c:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05d:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-05d:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-06:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-06:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-06a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-06a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-06b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-06b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-07:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-07:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-07a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-07a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-07b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-07b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-08:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-08:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-08a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-08a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-08b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-08b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-09:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-09:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-09a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-09a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-10a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-10a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-11a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-11a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-11b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-11b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-12a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-12a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-12b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2022-12b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-01a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-01a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-02:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-02:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-02a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-02a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-03:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-03:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-04:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-04:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-04a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-04a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-04b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-04b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-05:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-05:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-05a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-05a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-07:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-07:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-07a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-07a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-08:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-08:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-09:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-09:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-10:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-10a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-10a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-11:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-11a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-11a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-12:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-12a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2023-12a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01a:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01b:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01c:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01c:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01d:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01d:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01e:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:a:mailcow:mailcow\:_dockerized:2024-01e:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

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  • CVE-2025-2120 – A vulnerability was found in Thinkware Car Dashcam F800 Pro up to 20250226. It has been rated as problematic. This issue affects some unknown proce...
  • CVE-2025-2119 – A vulnerability was found in Thinkware Car Dashcam F800 Pro up to 20250226. It has been declared as problematic. This vulnerability affects unknown...
  • CVE-2025-2118 – A vulnerability was found in Quantico Tecnologia PRMV 6.48. It has been classified as critical. This affects an unknown part of the file /admin/log...