CVE-2019-18226 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Details

CVE-2019-18226
Vulnerability Scoring

9.8
/10
Critical Risk

As a catastrophic security flaw, CVE-2019-18226 has severe implications, demanding immediate intervention.

Attack Complexity Details

  • Attack Complexity: Low
    Exploits can be performed without significant complexity or special conditions.
  • Attack Vector: Network
    Vulnerability is exploitable over a network without physical access.
  • Privileges Required: None
    No privileges are required for exploitation.
  • Scope: Unchanged
    Exploit remains within the originally vulnerable component.
  • User Interaction: None
    No user interaction is necessary for exploitation.

CVE-2019-18226 Details

Status: Modified

Last updated: 🕟 21 Nov 2024, 04:32 UTC
Originally published on: 🕙 31 Oct 2019, 22:15 UTC

Time between publication and last update: 1847 days

CVSS Release: version 3

CVSS3 Source

nvd@nist.gov

CVSS3 Type

Primary

CVSS3 Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

CVE-2019-18226 Vulnerability Summary

CVE-2019-18226: Honeywell equIP series and Performance series IP cameras and recorders, A vulnerability exists in the affected products where IP cameras and recorders have a potential replay attack vulnerability as a weak authentication method is retained for compatibility with legacy products.

Assessing the Risk of CVE-2019-18226

Access Complexity Graph

The exploitability of CVE-2019-18226 depends on two key factors: attack complexity (the level of effort required to execute an exploit) and privileges required (the access level an attacker needs).

Exploitability Analysis for CVE-2019-18226

With low attack complexity and no required privileges, CVE-2019-18226 is an easy target for cybercriminals. Organizations should prioritize immediate mitigation measures to prevent unauthorized access and data breaches.

Understanding AC and PR

A lower complexity and fewer privilege requirements make exploitation easier. Security teams should evaluate these aspects to determine the urgency of mitigation strategies, such as patch management and access control policies.

Attack Complexity (AC) measures the difficulty in executing an exploit. A high AC means that specific conditions must be met, making an attack more challenging, while a low AC means the vulnerability can be exploited with minimal effort.

Privileges Required (PR) determine the level of system access necessary for an attack. Vulnerabilities requiring no privileges are more accessible to attackers, whereas high privilege requirements limit exploitation to authorized users with elevated access.

CVSS Score Breakdown Chart

Above is the CVSS Sub-score Breakdown for CVE-2019-18226, illustrating how Base, Impact, and Exploitability factors combine to form the overall severity rating. A higher sub-score typically indicates a more severe or easier-to-exploit vulnerability.

CIA Impact Analysis

Below is the Impact Analysis for CVE-2019-18226, showing how Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability might be affected if the vulnerability is exploited. Higher values usually signal greater potential damage.

  • Confidentiality: High
    Exploiting CVE-2019-18226 can result in unauthorized access to sensitive data, severely compromising data privacy.
  • Integrity: High
    CVE-2019-18226 could allow unauthorized modifications to data, potentially affecting system reliability and trust.
  • Availability: High
    CVE-2019-18226 can disrupt system operations, potentially causing complete denial of service (DoS).

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

The EPSS score estimates the probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the near future.

EPSS Score: 0.193% (probability of exploit)

EPSS Percentile: 57.97% (lower percentile = lower relative risk)
This vulnerability is less risky than approximately 42.03% of others.

CVE-2019-18226 References

External References

CWE Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-294

CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification

  • Session Sidejacking CAPEC-102 Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
  • Kerberoasting CAPEC-509 Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.
  • Remote Services with Stolen Credentials CAPEC-555 This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.
  • Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials CAPEC-561 An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.
  • Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay) CAPEC-60 This attack targets the reuse of valid session ID to spoof the target system in order to gain privileges. The attacker tries to reuse a stolen session ID used previously during a transaction to perform spoofing and session hijacking. Another name for this type of attack is Session Replay.
  • Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash) CAPEC-644 An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows domain credential hash values to access systems within the domain that leverage the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.
  • Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket) CAPEC-645 An adversary uses stolen Kerberos tickets to access systems/resources that leverage the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. An adversary can obtain any one of these tickets (e.g. Service Ticket, Ticket Granting Ticket, Silver Ticket, or Golden Ticket) to authenticate to a system/resource without needing the account's credentials. Depending on the ticket obtained, the adversary may be able to access a particular resource or generate TGTs for any account within an Active Directory Domain.
  • Use of Known Kerberos Credentials CAPEC-652 An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain.
  • Browser in the Middle (BiTM) CAPEC-701 An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.
  • Adversary in the Middle (AiTM) CAPEC-94 An adversary targets the communication between two components (typically client and server), in order to alter or obtain data from transactions. A general approach entails the adversary placing themself within the communication channel between the two components.

Vulnerable Configurations

  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h2w2pc1m_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h2w2pc1m_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h2w2pc1m:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h2w2pc1m:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h2w2per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h2w2per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h2w2per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h2w2per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h2w4per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h2w4per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h2w4per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h2w4per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w4per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w4per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w4per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w4per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w4per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w4per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w4per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w4per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w8pr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w8pr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w8pr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w8pr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbd2per1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbd2per1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbd2per1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbd2per1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw2per1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw2per1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw2per1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw2per1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw2per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw2per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw2per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw2per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw4per1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw4per1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw4per1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw4per1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw4per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw4per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw4per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw4per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw4pgr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw4pgr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw4pgr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw4pgr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw8pr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw8pr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw8pr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw8pr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hed2per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hed2per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hed2per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hed2per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew2per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew2per2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew2per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew2per2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew2per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew2per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew2per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew2per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew4per2b_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew4per2b_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew4per2b:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew4per2b:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew4per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew4per3_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew4per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew4per3:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew4per3b_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hew4per3b_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew4per3b:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hew4per3b:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdzp252di_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdzp252di_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdzp252di:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdzp252di:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdzp304di_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdzp304di_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdzp304di:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdzp304di:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hpw2p1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hpw2p1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hpw2p1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hpw2p1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h2w2gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h2w2gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h2w2gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h2w2gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w4gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w4gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w4gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w4gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w2gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w2gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w2gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w2gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w2gr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w2gr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w2gr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w2gr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w4gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h3w4gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w4gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h3w4gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4l2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4l2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4l2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4l2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w4gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w4gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w4gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w4gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4l2gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4l2gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4l2gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4l2gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2gr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w2gr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2gr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w2gr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w4gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4w4gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w4gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4w4gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4l6gr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4l6gr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4l6gr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4l6gr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hm4l8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hm4l8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hm4l8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hm4l8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4d8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:h4d8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4d8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:h4d8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbl2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbl2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbl2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbl2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw2gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw2gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw2gr3v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw2gr3v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw2gr3v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw2gr3v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw4gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbw4gr1v_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw4gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbw4gr1v:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbl6gr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbl6gr2_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbl6gr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbl6gr2:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hmbl8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hmbl8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hmbl8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hmbl8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbd8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hbd8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbd8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hbd8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hfd6gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hfd6gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hfd6gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hfd6gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hfd8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hfd8gr1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hfd8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hfd8gr1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302liw_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302liw_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302liw:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302liw:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302lik_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302lik_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302lik:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302lik:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302de_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302de_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302de:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302de:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302d_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302d_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302d:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302d:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302din-c1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302din-c1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302din-c1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302din-c1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302din-s1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hdz302din-s1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302din-s1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hdz302din-s1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hepz302w0_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hepz302w0_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hepz302w0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hepz302w0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcl2gv_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcl2gv_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcl2gv:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcl2gv:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcl2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcl2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcl2g:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcl2g:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcw2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcw2g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcw2g:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcw2g:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcw4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcw4g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcw4g:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcw4g:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcd8g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcd8g_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcd8g:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcd8g:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hsw2g1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hsw2g1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hsw2g1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hsw2g1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hswb2g1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hswb2g1_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hswb2g1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hswb2g1:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcw2gv_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:o:honeywell:hcw2gv_firmware:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcw2gv:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
    cpe:2.3:h:honeywell:hcw2gv:-:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

Protect Your Infrastructure against CVE-2019-18226: Combat Critical CVE Threats

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